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In many criminal cases, securing the services of
experts to examine evidence, to advise counsel,
and to testify at trial is critical. As the ABA Standards note, "The quality of representation at trial
may be excellent and yet valueless to the defendant if his defense requires ... the services of a
handwriting expert and no such service[] is available." Standards Relating to Providing Defense
Services 5-1.4 (2d ed. 1980).
Obtaining the services of experts is not difficult
for the prosecution. Typically, the prosecution has
access to the services of state, county, or metropolitan crime laboratories. E.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. §
21-2502 (1981); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 33-1559.1 (West
Supp. 1982); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 307.75
(Baldwin 1978). In addition, federal forensic
laboratories often provide their services to state
law enforcement agencies. For example, the services of the FBI Laboratory are "available without
charge to all duly constituted state, county, and
municipal law enforcement agencies of the United
States and its territorial possessions." Williams,
The FBI Laboratory-Its Availability and Use by
Prosecutors from Investigation to Trial, 28 U. Kan.
City L. Rev. 95, 99 (1960). See also Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Handbook of Forensic Science 6
(Rev. ed. 1979). These services include both the examination of evidence and the court appearance of
the expert.
Such services are generally not available to
criminal defendants. This may account for the disparity between the defense and prosecution use of
experts. The voiceprint cases illustrate this problem. As one study noted: "A striking fact about the
trials involving voicegram evidence to date is the
very large proportion in which the only experts testifying were those called by the state." National
Academy of Sciences, On the Theory and Practice
of Voice Identification 49 (1979). See also People v.
Chapter, 13 Grim. L. Rep. 2479 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1973) ("In approximately eighty percent of the
twenty-five [voiceprint] cases in which such expert
testimony/opinion was admitted there was no
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opposing expert testimony on the issue of reliability and general acceptability of the scientific community .... ").
A number of statutory provisions, state and federal, attempt to provide expert assistance to indigent criminal defendants. In addition, some courts
have recognized a constitutional right to expert
assistance. Finally, trial courts have the authority
to appoint experts to assist them.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Federal
In federal trials, the Criminal Justice Act provides for expert assistance for indigent defendants. Section (e)(1) of the Act reads:
Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary
for an adequate defense may request them in an ex
parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are
necessary and the person is financially unable to obtain them, the court, or the United States magistrate if
the services are required in connection with a matter
over which he has jurisdiction, shall authorize counsel
to obtain the services. 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(e)(1) (1976).

See generally Oaks, Obtaining Compensation and
Defense Services Under the Federal Criminal Justice Act, in 1 Criminal Defense Techniques ch. 7
(1069); 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 740 (1969); Annat., 6 A.L.R. Fed. 1007 (1971). The
Act limits expenses for expert services to $300.00
unless the court certifies that a greater amount is
"necessary to provide fair compensation for services of an unusual character or duration." 18
U.S.C. § 3006(A)(e)(3) (1976).
The general purpose of the Criminal Justice Act
is to "achieve more meaningful and effective
representation for defendants in Federal criminal
cases." H.R. Rep. No. 1546, 91st Gong., 2d Sess. 4,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Gong. & Ad. News
3982, 3984. In interpreting section (e), the courts
have identified a number of purposes: (1) "to
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redress the imbalance in the criminal process
when the resources of the United States Government are pitted against an indigent defendant,"
U.S. v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1976); (2)
"to place indigent defendants as nearly as may be
on a level of equality with nonindigent defendants
in the defense of criminal cases," U.S. v. Tate, 419
F.2d 131, 132 (6th Cir. 1969); and (3) "to accord federal prisoners fu!l constitutional rights under the
Due Process and the Sixth Amendment." Mason v.
Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U:S. 936 (1975).
A defendant seeking funds under the Act must
meet a two-pronged test: "(1) The accused must
satisfy the court that financial inability prevents
him from obtaining the services he requests; and
(2) The accused must show need for such services
to present an adequate defense." U.S. v. Schultz,
431 F.2d 907, 908 (8th Cir. 1970). The most common
type of expert requested pursuant to the statute is
the psychiatrist in insanity defense cases. E.g.,
U.S. v. Reason, 549 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1977); U.S. v.
Bass, 477 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1973). See generally
Comment, Developing Standards for Psychiatric
Assistance for Indigents Under the Criminal Justice Act, 59 Iowa L. Rev. 726 (1974); Note, Criminal
Procedure: The Indigent's Right to Psychiatric
Assistance at Trial, 20 Wayne L. Rev. 1365 (1974);
Note, The Criminal Justice Act of 1964- The
Defendant's Right to an Independent Psychiatric
Examination, 28 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 443 (1971);
Annat., 40 A.L.R. Fed. 707 (1978). Other requests
have involved polygraph examiners, U.S. v. Penick,
496 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
897 (1974); psychologists, U.S. v. Sims, 617 F.2d
1371 (9th Cir. 1980); fingerprint experts, U.S. v.
Durant, 545 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1976); and handwriting
examiners, U.S. v. Sailer, 552 F.2d 213 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 959 (1977). See also U.S. v.
Moss, 544 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1077 (1977) (optometrist); U.S. v. Harris, 542
F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1976) (clinical psychologist to
assist in jury selection and request for urban
sociologist).
Both the application for defense services and
the proceedings to determine whether to grant the
request are ex parte. As one court has noted, "The
manifest purpose of requiring that the inquiry be
ex parte is to insure that the defendant will not
have to make a premature disclosure of his case."
Marshall v. U.S., 423 F.2d 1315, 1318 (10th Cir.
1970). In effect, the provision permits the expert to
"be a partisan witness. His conclusions need not
be reported in advance of trial to the court or to
the prosecution." U.S. v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723, 726
(9th Cir. 1973).

stances in which a reasonable attorney would
engage such services for a client having independent financial means to pay for them." U.S. v. Bass,
477 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1973). This includes
"pretrial and trial assistance to the defense as
well as potential trial testimony." /d. at 726. Other
courts have adopted this interpretation and added
further elaboration. See U.S. v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d
951 (9th Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371 (9th
Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir.
1976); Brinkley v. U.S., 498 F.2d 505, 509-10 (8th Cir.
1974). For example, the Second Circuit has stated
that "'[n]ecessary' should at least mean 'reasonably necessary,' and 'an adequate defense' must
include preparation for cross-examination of a government expert as well as presentation of an expert defense witness." U.S. v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823,
827 (2d Cir. 1976). Thus, the admissibility of an expert's testimony is not the only relevant factor in
considering a request for a defense expert under
the statute. U.S. v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1375 n.3
(9th Cir. 1980).
State
A number of state statutes and rules also provide for expert assistance for indigent defendants.
These provisions, however, differ in many respects.
Some explicitly provide for the services of experts,
Minn. Stat. Ann.§ 611.21 (West Supp. 1982), while
others mention only investigative services. Alaska
Stat.§ 18.85.100 (1981). Still others refer merely to
the reimbursement of reasonable or necessary expenses incurred by attorneys representing indigent
defendants. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 21-1-105 (1973).
The coverage of these provisions also differs
with respect to the type of crime charged. Some
are limited to felony or capital cases, e.g., Fla.
Stat. Ann.§ 914.06 (West 1973) (felony cases); Ga.
Code Ann. § 27-3001(a) (1978) (capital cases). An
Ohio statute is limited to controlled substance
prosecutions. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2925.51 (Baldwin 1979). Moreover, some statutes provide for the
payment of reasonable expenses, Fla. Stat. Ann. §
914.06 (West 1973), while others specify a maximum amount, Ga. Code Ann.§ 27-3001(a) (1978)
($500). A number of the latter statutes provide for
expenses above the maximum in some circumstances. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 604-A:6 (1974) ($300
except in extraordinary circumstances). The
procedures specified for obtaining expert
assistance also vary. A number of statutes follow
the Criminal Justice Act and provide for ex parte
proceedings. E.g., Kan. Stat. Ann.§ 22-4508 (1981);
Minn. Stat. Ann.§ 611.21 (West Supp. 1982). Other
statutes contain no such provision.

CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The right of an indigent defendant to the services of expert witnesses may be based on several
different constitutional grounds: effective assistance of counsel, equal protection, due process, or
compulsory process. The courts, however; are
divided over this issue. Annat., 34 A.L.R. 3d 1256
(1970). See generally Margolin & Wagner, The lndi-

The Act entitles indigent defendants to expert
"services necessary for an adequate defense." 18
U.S.C. § 3006(A)(e) (1976). This standard has been
interpreted by a number of courts. The Ninth Circuit has held that "[t]he statute requires the district judge to authorize defense services when the
defense attorney makes a timely request in circum2

gent Criminal Defendant and Defense Services: A
Search for Constitutional Standards, 24 Hastings
L.J. 647 (1973); Note, The Indigent's Right to an
Adequate Defense: Expert and Investigational Assistance in Criminal Proceedings, 55 Cornell L.
Rev. 632 (1970); Note, Right to Aid in Addition to
Counsel tor Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 Minn.
L. Rev. 1054 (1963).
The U.S. Supreme Court has considered the
issue only once. In U.S. ex rei. Smith v. Baldi, 344
U.S. 561 (1953), a murder defendant argued that
"the assistance of a psychiatrist was necessary to
afford him adequate counsel" in the presentation
of his insanity defense, and thus the state was
obligated to provide such assistance. In rejecting
this argument, the Court stated, "We cannot say
that the State has that duty by constitutional mandate." /d. at 568. The precedential value of Baldi,
however, seems questionable. First, the case was
decided in 1953, well before the right to counsel
and the compulsory process clauses were applied
directly to the states and before more recent cases
delineating the scope of equal protection and due
process rights were decided. Second, two defense
psychiatrists did testify at the defendant's trial. Immediately after writing that the duty to provide expert assistance was not compelled by "constitutional mandate," the Court wrote: "As we have
shown, the issue of petitioner's sanity was heard
by the trial court. Psychiatrists testified. That suffices." /d. This may indicate only that the defendant did not have a right to an additional expert
witness.
Effective Assistance of Counsel
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the
U.S. Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel applicable to the states. Accordingly, the state must provide counsel to indigent
defendants. As the Court noted in Gideon, "[l]n our
,__ adversary system of criminal justice, any person
hailed into court who is too poor to hire a lawyer
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him." !d. at 344. The right to counsel
includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). Several courts
have found ineffective assistance where defense
counsel has failed to obtain the services of expert
witnesses. "The failure of defense counsel to seek
such assistance when the need is apparent deprives an accused of adequate representation in
violation of his sixth amendment right to counsel."
Proffitt v. U.S., 582 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980), Accord U.S. v.
Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275, 1279 (5th Cir. 1976) ("when
an insanity defense is appropriate and the defendant lacks funds to secure private psychiatric
assistance, it is the duty of his attorney to s.eek
such assistance through the use of [the Criminal
Justice Act].").

A number of courts have recognized that the
right to effective assistance of counsel places an
affirmative duty upon the state to provide expert
assistance to indigent defendants. See Hintz v.
Beta, 379 F.2d 937, 941 (5th Cir. 1967) ("effective
assistance of counsel ... may necessitate a psychiatric examination of a defendant."); Greer v.
Beta, 379 F.2d 923, 925 (5th Cir. 1967) (state policy
of not providing psychiatric experts for defense
"cannot ... avoid the federal constitutional right to
the effective assistance of counsel."); In re
Ketchell, 68 Cal.2d 397, 399, 438 P.2d 625, 627, 66
Cal. Rptr. 881, 883-84 (1968); People v. Worthy, 109
Cal. App.3d 514, 167 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1980); State v.
Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966); State v. Second Judicial District Court, 85 Nev. 241, 453 P.2d
421 (1969). As one court has noted, "[T]he right to
counsel is meaningless if the lawyer is unable to
make an effective defense because he has no
funds to provide the specialized testimony the
case requires." Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp.
560, 565 (N.D. Tex. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 672 (5th
Cir. 1965).
The leading case is Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d
1021 (4th Cir. 1980), in which an indigent murder
defendant requested the appointment of an independent forensic pathologist to determine the victim's cause of death. The request was denied by
the state trial court. In granting habeas relief, the
Fourth Circuit based its decision, in part, on the
right to counsel. "There can be no doubt that an
effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness." /d. at 1025. Under this
theory, expert assistance would be required if
necessary for counsel to render reasonably effective assistance; that is, "whenever the expert services are necessary to the preparation and presentation of an adequate defense." Proffitt v. U.S., 582
F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
910 (1980).
Equal Protection
The equal protection argument for the appointment of defense experts had its genesis in Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), in which an indigent
defendant challenged a state practice of conditioning appellate review upon the availability of a
transcript that the defendant could not afford. The
Supreme Court held that failure to provide a free
transcript denied the indigent defendant due process and equal protection. "There can be no equal
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends
on the amount of money he has." /d. at 19.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), extended
the "Griffin principle" to the appointment of counsel for a first appeal as of right. Other cases also
echoed this principle. "Griffin v. Illinois and its
progeny established the principle that the State
must, as a matter of equal protection, provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate
defense or appeal, when those tools are available
for a price to other prisoners." Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971).

Several courts have relied on this line of cases
in recognizing an indigent's right to expert assistance. For example, one court has written: "It is obvious that only [the defendant's] inability to pay for
the services of a psychiatrist prevented a proper
presentation of his case. The Supreme Court has
unmistakably held that in criminal proceedings it
will not tolerate discrimination between indigents
and those who possess the means to protect their
rights." Jacobs v. U.S., 350 F.2d 571, 573 (4th Cir.
1965). The leading case is Williams v. Martin, 618
F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980), in which an indigent
defendant requested the services of a forensic
pathologist to evaluate the victim's cause of death
in a homicide prosecution. The Fourth Circuit held
that the trial court's refusal to appoint an expert
"denied [the defendant] equal protection of the
law." /d. at 1027. According to the court, the standard for determining whether expert assistance is
constitutionally required is "(a) whether a substantial question requiring expert testimony arose over
the cause of death, and (b) whether Williams'
defense could be fully developed without professional assistance." /d. at 1026. The court's examination of the record revealed that a substantial
question about the cause of death did exist and
that the absence of an expert witness hampered
the development of this defense. In this regard, the
court held that "[i]t is not incumbent upon Williams to prove ... that an independent expert would
have provided helpful testimony at trial. An indigent prisoner ... should not be required to present
proof of what an expert would say when he is
denied access to an expert." /d. at 1026-27.
The principal problem with this line of cases is
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), which commentators believe substantially undercuts the
Griffin-Douglas rationale. See L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law 1119 (1978) (Douglas "effectively sterilized" in Ross); Kamisar, Poverty, Equality, and Criminal Procedure: From Griffin v. Illinois
and Douglas v. California to Ross v. Moffitt, in National College of District Attorney, Constitutional
Law Deskbook 1-78 (3d ed. 1978). Ross involved the
appointment of counsel for discretionary appeals.
The Supreme Court held that a state practice not
to appoint counsel in such cases satisfied the
equal protection guarantee. According to the
Court, the equal protection clause "does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages." 417 U.S. at 612. Although the Court recognized the disadvantage an indigent suffered in
comparison with a nonindigent in this context, it
held that the "duty of the State ... is not to du p Iicata the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure
the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to
present his claims fairly in the context of the
State's appellate process." /d. at 616. Thus, the
focus of the Court's analysis was not the disparity
between indigent and nonindigent, but whether the
indigent had an "adequate opportunity" to present

his case. This approach smacks more of a due
process than an equal protection analysis. See
Kamisar, supra, at 1-101. Earlier in the opinion the
Court had pointed out that equal protection analysis "emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State
between classes of individuals whose situations
are arguably indistinguishable," whereas due process "emphasizes fairness between the State and
the individual dealing with the State, regardless of
how other individuals in the same situation may be
treated." 417 U.S. at 609.
Although Ross weakens the equal protection
argument for expert assistance, it does not completely undercut it. Without an expert witness, an
indigent may not have an "adequate opportunity"
to present a defense.
Due Process
There are several lines of due process analysis
that may support the right to defense experts.
First, a defendant has a due process right to present a defense. As the Supreme Court has noted,
"Few rights are more fundamental than that of an
accused to present witnesses in his own defense."
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
An indigent defendant may need the services of an
expert to present a defense. The leading case is
Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), in which an indigent defendant in a paternity action argued that
the state's failure to provide funds for blood grouping tests deprived him of due process. The Supreme Court agreed. Referring to paternity actions
as "quasi-criminal," the Court applied a three-step
analysis. First, the Court identified the "private interests at stake"-the financial burden on the
defendant if he is adjudged to be the father and
the creation of a parent-child relationship. The
Court found these interests to be substantial. Second, the Court considered the "risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous results and
the probable value of the suggested procedural
safeguard." Here, the Court held that "access to
blood grouping tests for indigent defendants ...
would help to insure the correctness of paternity
decisions .... " /d. at 14. Third, the Court considered the "governmental interests affected." Although the Court recognized the state's financial
interest if required to provide blood tests, it did not
find that interest to be significant. In sum, the
Court found that the state's failure to provide
funds for blood grouping tests deprived the defendant of his due process right to "a meaningful
opportunity to be heard." /d. at 16.
Applying these three elements to a case in
which an indigent defendant in a criminal case requests expert assistance is straightforward. First,
a criminal defendant's interest in a criminal prosecution would be significantly greater than a civil
defendant's stake in a paternity action. Second,
the denial of the use of scientific evidence that
has been recognized as reliable would create a
substantial risk of erroneous results. Third, the
state's interest, as in Streater, is financial. In manY
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cases the expense would be greater in a criminal
case than in a paternity case, but it is doubtful
that such an interest would outweigh the defendant's interest in liberty.
A second due process argument is based on the
, state's providing expert assistance to the prosecution while denying such assistance to the defense.
"'Due process' emphasizes fairness between the
State and the individual dealing with the
State .... " Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974).
Thus, in discussing the right to expert assistance
under the Criminal Justice Act, one court has
noted: "If the fairness of our system is to be
assured, indigent defendants must have access to
minimal defense aids to offset the advantage presented by the vast prosecutoriai and investigative
resources available to the Government." U.S. v.
Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254, 258 (9th Cir. 1975). See also
U.S. v. Stifei, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971) ("[l]f the government
sees fit to use this time consuming expensive
means of fact-finding [neutron activation analysis],
it must both allow time for a defendant to make
similar tests, and in the instance of an indigent
defendant, a means to provide for payment for
same.").
A third due process argument centers on the
prosecutor's duty to disclose favorable material
defense evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963). A number of courts have regarded
the failure of the state to provide expert assistance as a denial of the right to present exculpatory defense evidence. Thus, one court has written:
"[T]he denial of a reasonable request to obtain the
services of a necessary psychiatric witness is effectually a suppression of evidence violating the
fundamental right of due process." U.S. ex rei.
Robinson, 345 F.2d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 1965), att'd in
part, remanded in part on other grounds, 383 U.S.
375 (1966). Accord Bowen v. Eyman, 324 F. Supp.
339, 340 (D. Ariz. 1970) ("refusal to run the tests is
tantamount to a suppression of evidence such as
--there was in Brady ... ").

and other matters that routinely arise in criminal
litigation." Western, Compulsory Process /1, 74
Mich. L. Rev. '192, 203 (1975).
A number of courts have based a defendant's
right to expert testimony on the compulsory process right. in Flores v. Estelle, 492 F.2d 711 (5th Cir.
1974), for example, the defendant attempted to
elicit expert opinion testimony from a state toxicologist who had been subpoenaed by the defense.
The expert refused to give an opinion because he
had not been retained as an expert witness and
the trial court declined to require him to testify.
The state and federal courts which reviewed the
case agreed "that the trial court erred in refusing
to require [the expert] to testify, thereby depriving
Flores of effective compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, Washington v.
Texas .... " /d. at 712.
The leading case is People v. Watson, 36 lli.2d
228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966), in which an indigent
forgery defendant requested the appointment of a
handwriting expert. The Illinois Supreme Court
held that the refusal to appoint the expert violated
the defendant's right to compulsory process:
The court recognizes that there is a distinction between the right to call witnesses and the right to have
these witnesses paid for by the government, but in
certain instances involving indigents, the lack of
funds with which to pay for the witness will often
preclude him from calling that witness and occasionally prevent him from offering a defense. Thus,
although the defendant is afforded the shadow of the
right to call witnesses, he is deprived of the
substance. /d. at 233.
The court went on to conclude "[w]hether it is
necessary to subpoena witnesses in order to
assure a fair trial will depend upon the facts in
each case." /d. at 234. Watson was such a case
because the "issue of handwriting goes to the
heart of the defense" and the expert's testimony
"may have been crucial" to the defense. /d.
COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS

A trial court has inherent authority to appoint expert witnesses. See Advisory Committee's Note,
Fed. R. Evid. 706 ("The inherent power of a trial
judge to appoint an expert of his own choosing is
virtually unquestioned."); C. McCormick, Evidence
§ 17 (2d ed. 1972); Sink, The Unused Power of a
Federal Judge to Call His Own Expert Witnesses,
29 S. Cal. L. Rev. 195 (1957). This authority has
been codified in statutes and court rules in many
jurisdictions. See 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 563
(Chadbourn rev. 1979) (listing rules and statutes).
For a discussion of Ohio law on this subject, see
P. Giannelli, Ohio Evidence Manual§ 702.07 (1982).
Federal Evidence Rule 706(a) provides:
The court may on its own motion or on the motion of
any party enter an order to show cause why expert
witnesses should not be appointed, and may request
the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the par-

Compulsory Process
in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the compulsory process clause applied in state trials. Moreover, the
Court adopted a liberal view of the clause; it was
not limited to the right to subpoena witnesses, but
also included the right to present defense evidence. "The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a
defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to
the jury so it may decide where the truth lies." !d.
at 19. Although Washington did not involve expert
~Witnesses, "it is scarcely conceivable that defend• ants could be constitutionally denied the opportunity to calf experts to give opinion evidence about
;such matters as fingerprints, bloodstains, sanity,
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Texas v. Brown, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982): Whether
warrantless seizure of a bulging tied-up balloon,
which the police officer, based on his professional
experience with illicit narcotics trade, allegedly
had probable cause to believe contained illegal
drugs, is valid under the Fourth Amendment.
Florida v. Brady, 102 S. Ct. 2266 (1982): Whether
the open fields doctrine is applicable to an
1,800-acre open field that is fenced by barbed wire,
locked, and posted.
U.S. v. Place, 102 S. Ct. 2901 (1982): Whether
police may seize and detain personal luggage reasonably suspected of containing narcotics for the
purpose of inspection by a narcotics detection
dog.
U.S. v. Knotts, 31 102 S. Ct. 2956 (1982): Whether
beeper surveillance of the location or movement of
an object that is within a private area requires a
warrant.
Jones v. U.S., 102 S. Ct. 999 (1982): Whether the
defendant has the burden of proof for release after
an insanity acquittal commitment.
Florida v. Royer, 102 S. Ct. 631 (1982): Whether a
stop at an airport based on the drug courier profile
is valid under the Fourth Amendment.

ties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own
selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by
the court unless he consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of his duties by the court in
writing, a c.opy of which shall be filed with the clerk,
or at a conference in which the parties shall have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall
advise the parties of his findings, if any; his deposition may be taken by any party; and he may be called
to testify by the court or any party. He shall be subject to cross-examination by each party, including a
party calling him as a witness.

Rule 706(c) provides that the decision whether to
disclose to the jury that the expert has been appointed lies within the discretion of the trial court.
Rule 706(d) recognizes the right of the parties to
call their own experts, notwithstanding the appointment of an expert by the court. See generally
3D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence§
404-06 (1979); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 1 706[01] (1981).
There are several disadvantages associated with
the court appointment of expert witnesses. First, if
the jury is informed of the appointment, the witness may be cloaked with the authority of the
court, at least in the eyes of the jury. The Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 706 acknowledges this
problem: "court appointed experts [may] acquire
an aura of infallibility to which they are not entitled .... " Second, the motion for the appointment of an expert may disclose a defense theory
previously unknown to the prosecution. In contrast, the motion for the appointment of a defense
expert under the Criminal Justice Act is ex parte,
thus precluding prosecution discovery in most
cases.
*

*

Right to Counsel
Morris v. Slappy, 102 S. Ct. 1748 (1982): Whether
the Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant
to demand continued representation by the same
public defender who represented him earlier in the
proceedings.
Jones v. Barnes, 102 S. Ct. 2902 (1982): Whether
assigned counsel is required to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by a defendant on appeal
from conviction.

*

Prosecutorial Misconduct
U.S. v. Hastings, 102 S. Ct. 2232 (1982): Whether
the harmless error doctrine should be applied to a
prosecutor's comment on defendant's failure to
testify.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The U.S. Supreme Court docket for the 1982-83
term has begun to take shape. The Court has
granted review in the following cases.

Trial Proceedings
Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982):
Whether civil deposition testimony which repeats
prior testimony given under a use immunity statute
is information directly or indirectly derived from
such testimony and whether such testimony is
unavailable for use against the deponent in any
subsequent prosecution.
South Dakota v. Neville, 102 S. Ct. 2232 (1982):
Whether the evidentiary use of a drunk driver's
refusal to take a blood-alcohol test violates the
Fifth Amendment.

Arrest, Search and Seizure
Illinois v. Gates, 102 S. Ct. 997 (1982): (1)
Whether detailed information provided by an anonymous informer, coupled with government corroboration of information, provides probable cause for
issuance of a search warrant; (2) Whether the
Court should recognize a good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule.
Kolender v. Lawson, 102 S. Ct. 2033 (1982):
Whether an individual may be punished for refusing to identify himself during a lawful investigatory
stop.
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